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Introduction
ERISA, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Secudty Act of 1974,2
was instituted by Congtess to stan-
dardrze the health, retirement, and
disabiJity plans offered by private
employers in the United States. For
plaintìffs' lawyers, the Act may be
most notable for its express preemp-
tion of stâte common law remedies
for denial, reduction, or termination
of benefìts promised under em-
ployer-sponsoted plans. Any cause of
actjon regarding such benefit deci-
sions can only be based on equitable
remedies provided in the ,A.ct itself.
\Øhile the Act does not allow the
compensâtory and punitive damages
which are standard tools for state-
court remedy of violations of insurer
prornises, it does provide for a rea-
sonable attorney fee in some cases
where the employee prevails against
an ERISÄ plan. Not surprisingl¡
ERIS,\ is commonly viewed as the
bane of existence for lawyer's repte-
senting injured persons who must
depend on benefits from an ERISrq.
plan, and not without justifìcation.
A key feature of ERIS,{ plans in
the past decade has been the "discre-
tionaty clause," a provision that pur-
ports to confet on the ERISA plan
administrator or insurer dre poweq in
its sole discretion, to determine eligi-
bility for bene{ìts and to interpret the
terms and provisions of the plan
policy. Because federal courts have
elected to treat the administratoïs'
decisions in exercising such discre-
tion as equivalent to administrative
decisions of government agencies,
they have tended to limit judicial
review by applying a standard requir-
ing deference to the decision except
in cases of abuse of discretion.3 The
end result is that one party to the
contract, the plan administrator, has
significant power to determine terms
of the contract after the inception of
the contract. The insuted must appeal
to the plan and can only achieve
redress of grievances ìn court if he
or she can show abuse of discretion.
Notably, this process means the in-
sured never had the use of any dis-
covery, such as a depositìon, to
inquire how the denial decision was
made in the fìrst place.
Unfortunately, in 1989, the
Supreme Court in Fire¡tone Tire dy
Røbber Co. u. Brach,a approved the use
of discretionary clauses in health, life,
and disability employer-sponsored
bene{ìt plans. This coupled with
holdings that decisions under the
discretionary clause would be re-
viewed undet an abuse-of-discretion
standarcì meant that the benefits
decisions of private insutance com-
panies were being accorded the same
deference as decisions of agencies of
the executive branch of government.
In2006, the then Insurance
Commissioner fot the State of Mon-
tana, John Morrison, prohibited the
use of the discretionary clause in
employer-based plans in Montana. He
concluded, under the language of
MCA S 33-1,-502Q) that such clauses
are "inconsistent, ambiguous and
misleading" and "deceptively affects
the risk purported to be assumed in
the general coverage of the contract"
so âs to render the clauses violative
of the statute. \X/hjle ERISÂ pre-
empts state law as it appJies to
ERISA plans, the Äct provides ân
exceptìon for "regulation of the busi-
ness of insurance" and Morrison
acted under that cxception.
Motrison-was not alone in
banning discretionary clauses. In
2002, the National ,A.ssociation of
Insurance Commissioners Q.JAIC)
had adopted Model Act 42 tided
"Prohibition on the Use of Discre-
tionary Clauses Model Act." The
Nr{JC recommended that its mem-
bers initiate legislation to prohibit
clauses that purport to "teserve dis-
crefion to the health carúer to inter-
pret the terms of the conúact, or to
provide standards of interpretation or
review that are inconsistent with the
laws of the state." Commissioners in
states including New York (2006),5
Cahfornta (2004),6 and Illinois
Q00 5),7 prohibited discretionary
clauses in the plans.
The Commissioner, John
Mofrison, was sued by the industry
in federal court in Montana but won
summary judgment in Judge Molloy's
court. The case was appealed to the
9ù Circuit and. may someday reach
the United States Supteme Court.
The issue of the pov/er of state in-
surance commissioners to regulate
the use of the discretionary clause is
of gteat importânce and provides
readers of Trial Trends ân opportunity
to visit the underpinnings of ERIS,\,
the discretionary clause, and thc au-
thority of the Insurance Commis-
sioner. Such a review should assist
plaintiffs' counsel in dealing with the
ever present problems created by
ERISA.
Bacþround of ERISA
By implication, ERISA is very
much a part of the health care debate
in the United States today. Because
the U.S. does not have universal
health care, the major source of
health care coverage in the country
has been sponsored by employers. It
does not appear that any politicaþ
viable teform of ,A.merican health
care is going to change that. In order
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to encourâge private employers to provide health, disabil-
ity, and retitement bene{ìts, Congress passed the Employ-
ment Income Retirement and Security Act in 1974. \X/hile
a major impetus for the Act was protection and promo-
tion of pension plans, health câre was included. Today, an
estimated 85% of Âmericans receive health câre coverage
from theit employers, though not all of the employment-
based plans are governed by ERIS,{.
In ERISAs preamble, Congress made clear three im-
portant intentions: (1) protection of plan participants and
bene{ìciaries by requiring certain ltnancial accounting and
disclosure to them; (2) estabJishing standards of conduct
and responsibiJity for the fìduciaries involved in the plans;
and (3) establishing a system of remedies and sanctions to
enforce rights and obligations under the Act.
The fìrst two intentions and the anti-discrimination
provisions of the ,\ct were aimed at preventing abuses.
The function of the third was to introduce a uniform
strlrcture for the handling of claims arising out of denial,
reduction, or termination of benefits. In order to encour-
age employers ("plan sponsors') to provide health, disabil-
ity, and pension benefìts, Congress abrogated the rights of
employees ('plan participants") to bring câuses of action
based in state law against the employers providing the
benefit plans and their insurance companies. Insteacl,
Congress substituted a set of remedies entirely based in
E,RISA.
The Act recognizes "plan administrâtors," often insur-
ers which owe a {ìduciary obligation to benefìt the plan
and employees. The plan sponsor or plan administrator
may delegate administrative duties to a "tlird-party
administratotl' agitn often an insurer, which simply
provides administration for the plan and does not provide
benefìts.
ERISAfs Preemption of State Law
ERISA provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsec-
tion þ) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter...
shall supercede any and all state laws insofar as they may
rìow or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. .,."8
A classic example of the import of that preemptìon can
be seen in the treatment Montana's "made-whole" rule
with regard to insurer subrogation. Since 1977, tn Skøwge
u. Moantain Stater'1-e/. dy Te/. Co.,e the Montana Supreme
Court has held that an insurer carìnot claim subrogation
until the insured has recovered the insured's entire loss
including costs and âttorney fees.lo This is known as the
"made-whole" rule. Insurance subrogation and the made-
whole rule are creations of the state courts. In the case
of ERISA plans, such common law is preempted.ll The
9ù Circuit Court of ,\ppeals, in 1994, adopted the made-
whole rule for ERIS,\ plans in Barnes u. Independent Auto
Dealers Ass'n of CaQfornia Heahh and IYefare Berueft Plan,12
but said, "absent an agreement to the cotttrîúy, an insut-
ance company may not enforce a right to subrogation
untjl the insured has been fully compensated for her inju-
ries, that is, has been made whole." Unfortunately, the
câse was an open invitation to the plan drafters to make
each plan "aî agteement to the corrlraty," ancl it is com-
mon today that plans expressly provide that the plan gets
full subrogation tegatdless of whether the insured has
been made whole. The unjust result can be seen in the
federal court decisionin Marqais u. Ironwor/<ers Intermown-
tain Heahh and IYefare Tra¡t Fønd13 where the ERISA
health plan language expressly abrogated the made-whole
doctrine. There Judge Molloy decried the fact that Circuit
precedent forced him to allow the insurer to collect
$317,000 subrogatìon from an $800,000 total tort
recovery of a worker rendered quadriplegic.
More importantly, state law of insurance bad faith and
the accompanying claims for relief and remedies such as
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punitive damages are preempted
undet ERISA wder Pilot Life u.
Dedeaax la and Aetna Health Inc. u.
Dauila.1s Preemption of state laws
and remedies effectìvely removes any
meaningful sanctions and severely
restricts the incentive for an ERISÂ
plan administrator's failure to meet
the full benefit obligations owed to
their insureds.
Claims by the fnsured Employee
Under ERISA Plans
The ERISA plans provide for
an internal process for appeal of
benefit decisions. This generally re-
quires the employee to appeal to an
entity or person involvecl with the
plan administrator. The employee
aggrieved by a benefits decision will
fìle any necessary medical records or
other evidence supporting his or her
position. ERISA provides for notice
of decisions but does not provide for
a'hearing in such appeals. Neverthe-
less, the insured must exhaust this
appeù process just as claimants in
the admrnistrative system of the
executive btanch must exhaust
administrative remedies before
fiLing in a Federal district court.
If the administrator denies the
claim on appeal, the insured can {ile
an action based in the ¡{.ct for statu-
tory relief. The insured cânnot file a
breach of contrâct claim or other
common law legal claim.
Most importantly, where the plan
contains a discretionary clause, the
standard of judicial review on appeal
to a district court is not de nouo.'[he
cou-rts have treated the discretion the
ERISA plan grants itself much lìke
the discretion of government admin-
istrative agencies. Consequently, the
courts grant deference to the decision
of the plan and can only reverse the
decision of the administrator on a
finding of abuse of discretion. ,\s the
Federal District Court in Massachu-
setts said in Radþrd Trøst u. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Americø,16 Congress
placed "limitations on judicial review
of plan administratots and fiducia-
ries' decisions similat to the ones
placed on judicial review of govern-
mental agency action, even though,
unlike officials in govetnmental agen-
cies, administrâtors and fìduciaries
are not answerable to the public or to
elected offìcials." As John Garamendi
noted as Insurance Commissioner
for the State of California, "This
standard of review deprives Califor-
nia insureds of access to the protec-
tions in the Insurance Code and in
California Law."17
The Third Circuit, 'tn Brach u.
Firestone Tire dv Rabber C0.18 said that
the arbitrary and capricious standard
originated with the Labor Manage-
ment Relations ¿{.ct but noted that,
by nature of the LMRÂ require-
mcnts, there was a certain assurancc
of impartiality of the trustees in
those plans. The Bruclt court noted
that, in any unfunded plan run erì-
tirely by the employer, "every dollar
provided in benefìts is a dollar spent
by defendant Firestone, the employer;
and every dollar saved by the admin-
istrator on behalf of his employer is
a dollar in Firestone's pocket." The
court questioned judicial deference to
such decisions undet an abuse-of-
discretion standard because of the
inherent conflict of interest.
Hawaü, whìle permittìng the
discretionary clause, stripped deci-
sions under that clause from the
deference standard and specified that
f udiciat review of decisions made
under discretionary clauses are sub-
ject to de nouo review:1e This allows
the insured discovery and a full tdal
on the merits.
ERISAIs "Savings Clause" and
the Tradition of State Regulation
of Insurance
ERISAs express and sweeping
preemption of state common law in
favot of a unifotm fedetal structure
for resolving claims for denial, reduc-
tion, or termination of benefìts has a
"savings" clause, which provides that
"nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to exempt ot relieve any
person from any law of any State
which regulates ìnsurance."2O Hence,
state laws regulating the business of
insutance sutvive the broad federal
preemption of ERISA.
Underpinning the savings clause
is 150 years of alegal tradition in
which the insurance industry has
been regulated by the states and not
the federal government. In 1869, the
United States Supreme Court held in
PaøJ u. Virginìa,21 that issuance of
policies of insurance were not trans-
actions in commerce, reasoning that
they were not traded or bartered in a
mafket and were not "articles of
commerce in any proper meaning of
the word," or "commodities to be
shipped from one state to another."
Consequendy, Congress could not
regulate insurance undet the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution.
Moreoveq it was impJicit when Con-
gress enacted the antitrust provisions
in the Sherman Act in 1890 that the
provisions would not apply to insur-
ance. ,{.s a tesult, there developed a
system of state regulation of the
insurance industry. That system had
a national as opposed to fedetal
aspect insofar as there was coopera-
tion between the states through the
growing National ,\ssociation of
Insutance Commissioners.
However, in 1944, the Supreme
Court rocked the insurance industry
in United StaÍes u. Soutb-Easlern IJnder-
wriÍers As¡ociation by holdtng that
transactions of an insurance rating
bureau and its membet companies
which were alleged to constitute
boycotts and antitrust violations
could be regulated under the Com-
merce Clause.2z The overruling of
Paal u. Vzrgìnia and its implications
for the'ìndustry caused Congtess, .i
at the behest of the N,A.IC and the
industr¡ to enact the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in L945.23 McCanan-
Ferguson expressly provided for the
continued tegulation of the business
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of insurance by the several states to
the exclusion of the federal govern-
ment.2a McCarran-Fetguson also
provided that the Sherman Act would
apply only to agfeements to boycott,
coerce, or intimiclate.2s Consequendy,
insurance today is regulated by the
states, although the system may be
described as "national" regulation in
light of the coordinated efforts of
the NAIC, the orgarization of the
state insurance commissioners, espe-
ciaþ the promotion of uniform laws
and regulations by that group.
The Tension Between State
Regulation of Insutance ând
ERISA Preemption of State Law
ERISA mandates that, in cases
of benefit disputes, all state remedies
avitlable to the insured (i.e., breach
of conúact, bad faith, and negligent
representation) are preempted, and
the insured is limited to the remedies
specifìed in the Act. It then excepts
from this preemption any state law
that regulates insurance. As Judge
Molloy said in deciding Standard
Insarance Conparry u. Joltn Morrison,
"...when federal law provides a uni-
form regulatory and enfotcement
scheme while simultaneously and
expressly recognizing a space within
this scheme for state governments to
'regulate insurance,' the question
becomes one of fìt between the state
fnsurance Commissionet's action and
the federal statutofy scheme Con-
gress has established."26 The tension
arises when an insurance commis-
sioner acts to regulate an ERISA plan
under a state law regulating insurance
with the expectation thai it will fall
under the savings clause, whjle the
ERISA plan expects that it is free
from the act under ERISAs inhetent
preemption. The dispute ovet the
discretionary clauses illusftates this
perfectly.
Coufts too afe exasperated by
ERISA and the issues it provokes.
Judge \X/illiam Acker, Jr., Senior
United States Judge for the Northern
District of ,{labama writing in a law
review article describes ERISA as
"beyond redemptìon" saying that
"Occasionally a statute comes along
that is so poody contemplated by the
draftspersons that it cânnot be saved
by judicial interpretation, innovation,
or manipulation. It becomes a
litigant's plaything ancl a judge's
nightmare. ERISA falls into this
category."z1 The 7'h Circuit ques-
tioned why the United States
Supreme Court cleterminecl that
disputes between employees and
insurance companies over the mearl-
ing of contract terms were disputes
under ERISA to be resolvecl in
Federal Courts.28
Of particular importance to
insurers is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court, in Pilot Life u.
Dedeaøx2e and Aetna Health Inc. u.
D aui/a,3o interpreted "state regulation
of insurance" nartowly enough to
exclude claims involving bad faith
and punitive damages. Judicial deter-
mination that bad faith insurance
suits are not "tegulation of insur-
ance" protected from ERISTA. pre-
emption means the plans have way
less economic incentive to pay claims.
Inevitably then, the plans and
their insureds are going to square off
on the issue of whether the state
regulation supporting the insured's
position is state regulation of insur-
ance within the meaning of the Act's
savings clause. The stakes are erìor-
mous as is best illustrated by an inter-
nal memo of Provident Insurance
Company of October 2, 1,995.31
There an execu[ivc writes:
The advantages of ERIS'\
coverâge in litigious situations
are enofmous: stâte law is pre-
empted by federal law, there
are no jury trials, and there are
no compensatory or punitive
damages. Relief is usually lim-
ited to the amount of benefit
in question, and claims admin-
istrators may receive deferen-
tial stanclatd of review: The
economic impact on Provident
from having policies covered
by ERIS,\ could be signifìcant.
As an example, Glenn Felton
identifìed 12 claim situarions
where we settled for $7.8 mil-
lion in the aggregate. If these
12 cases had been covered by
ERISA, our liability would
have been betq/een zero and
$0.5 million.
The executive inveighs personnel
to identify and initiate modifìcation
of plans to be covered under ERISA
wherever possible.
Standard fnsutance Company's
Discretionaty Clauses
Standard is an insurance com-
pany organtzed in Oregon and autho-
itzed to sell disabiliry accidental
death and dismemberment poJicies.
The company has historically in-
cluded discretionaty clauses in both
ERIS,A. and non-ERISA policies.
In2005, when Morrison ordered
Standard to remove the clauses, the
compâny elected instead to 
^tta;ch 
a
rider entitled a "Gtattt of Discretion"
which, by its terms only applied to
the ERISA policies. In 2006,
Morrison disapproved the "Gtant
of Discretiofl" clauses, and Standard
filed separate actions in state and
federal court in Montana seeking
injunctive ancl declaratory reJief
under the allegation that ERISA
preempted any legal authority the
commissioner may have had to
regulate the clauses.
The Authority of the Montana
Insutance Commissioner to
Regulate Insurance Provisions
The Commissioner of Insurance
in Montana has the authority to en-
force the insurance code in the state,
and accordingly, the authority to
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regulate insurance. MCA S 33-1-311(1) and (2) provide
that the Commissioner "shall enforce the applicable
provisions of the laws" of the State of Montana and
has "the powers and authority exptessly conferred upon
þim] or reasonably implied from the provisions of
the laws of this state." He is expressly given the duty
of approving or disapproving the forms usecl by the
insurers in the state.32
MCA S 33-1-502 ptovides that "the commissioner
shall disapprove any form... or withdraw any previous
approval..." if the form "contains...any inconsistent,
ambiguous, or misleadrng clauses or exceptions and
conditions which deceptiveþ affect the risk purported to
be assumed in the general coverage of the contrâct...
"LJnder this authority, Commissioner John Morrison
disapproved the discretionary clauses in poJicies of
Standatd Insutance Company.
The Test for Determining if the Regulator's Act
is ((State Regulation of Insurancet'
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court in Ken-
tøcþ Ass'ru of Health Plans, Inc. u. Mi//er,33 set forth a tv/o-
part test for determining whethet 
^ 
sta;te law regulates
insurance so âs to be protected from ERiSA preemption
under the savings clause:
Today we... hold that for a state law to be
deemed a "law... which regulates insurance"
under $ 1144þX2X,{), it must satisfy two re-
quirements. First, the state law must be specifì-
cally directed toward entities engaged in
insurance. [Citations omitted]. Second, as ex-
plained above, the state law must substantially
affect the risk pooJing arrangement between
the insurer and the insured. I(entucky's law
satisfìes each of these requirements.
The first part of the test, whether the state law is
specifìcaþ dìrected toward entities engaged ìn insur-
ance is more often than not the proverbial "flo
brainer." The Supreme Court has held that, "as a
'Jilatter 
of common sense," a Caltfotnta statute requir-
ing insurers to prove prejudice before enforcing
proof-of-claim tequiremerrts wâs directed at such
entities.3a \n Røsh Prwdential IIMO, Inc. u. Moran,35
Illinois statute provided for an independent medical
review panel that could review the denials of claims
by an HMO governed by ERISA. llhen that panel
found that a surgical procedure was medically neces-
sary after the HMO said it was not, the law was at-
tacked as being preempted by ERIS,\. The Supreme
Court held that the statute was a law "directecl to-
ward" the insurance industry.
In Standard Instlrance Companl u. John Morriszft, the
statute requiring disapproval of plan provisions that
are "inconsistent, âmbiguous, or misleading" or which
"deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed
in the general covetage of the conlracl'is aimed
solely at insurance policies. In the trial court and at
the 9d' Circuit, Standard argued that the statute
mereþ applies contra proferentem, the doctdne that
ambiguity in a contract is construed against the
clrafter, ancl that contra þroferentem is apphed under
state law to all contracts, not just insurance contracts.
Stanc{ard then reasoned that the statute is not directed
to insurance companies. Flowever, the core of the
statute prohibits clauses that "deceptively affect
the risk purported to be assumed in the general
coverage...," which prohibition is directed only at
insurance poJicies and not other contracts. Judge
Molloy followed the Supreme Court precedents in
determining that John Morrison's conduct in prohibit-i ing discretionary clauses in Montanahealth plans,"...
is the stuff of garden variety insurance regulation
through the imposition of standard poJicy terms,"
quoting Rush Prudential.36 Molloy simply found that
disapproval of the discretionary clauses in ERISA
plans "is directed at entities engaged in insurance."
The second determination, whether disapproval
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l1
of the clauses "substantially affects
the risk pooling ârrângement," has
hinged on the defìrution of risk pool-
ing. The industry argues that the term
"risk pooling" is an acttntizl term
peculiar to the insurance industry,
which is the sole àù:,itet of its appli-
cation. Standard argued at length in
Montana Federal District Court that
risk pooJing meâns the act by which
insurance actuaties decide in which
risk classification the insured is
placed. Standard's contention is that,
once that classifìcation is made, the
risk pool is set, and nothing that
happens after that can affect risk
pooling. Consequently, the company's
decisions under the discretionary
clause after the insured suffers a loss
cannot substantiah affect the risk
pooling 
^rt^ngemenlHowever, this does not âccord
with the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncem ent in Kentucþ
Ass'n that "it suffìces that they [the
statutes] substantially affect the risk
pooling arcàngement between the
insurer and the insured." The court
there defined "risk pooJing" as
altering "the scope of permissible
bargains between insurers and
insuteds."37 The Kentøcþt Ass'n court
held that a statute there which ex-
panded the number of providers
from whom an insurer could receive
health services "altered the scope of
permissible bargains between insurers
and insureds" so âs to affect the risk
pooling arrøflgerr'ents. Jim Hunt,
counsel for Morrison in the Standard
Insurance Company case, ably argued
that Morrison's prohibition of the
discretionary clauses altered the per-
missible bargatn between the insurers
and the insureds in Montana. No
longer could the plan agreement
which is the subject of the bargin
contain a discretionary clause, and
Judge Molloy found that prohibition
"alters the scope of permissible
batgains between insurers and
insuteds."38 Hence, his quote from
Rush Prudentsal that "this is the stuff
of garden vairety insurance regula-
tion through the imposition of
standard policy terms."3e
Ptogress and Status of the
Litigation in Montana
Standatd Insurance Company
could have litigated the issue of the
discretionary clause in some of the
most populous venues in the nation,
New Yotk, California, or Illinois,
where insurance commissioners
banned the clause. One cannot help
speculating that the company chose
Montana Federal Court as its venue
for challenging authority of an insur-
ance commissioner on the belief that
the courts here would be more
friendly to their position or perhaps
too unsophisticated to deal with it.
There is a litde humor in that choice
given the insurance expertise of the
Montana coufts, the consumer orien-
tation of Commissioner Morrison,
and the cadre of zealous plaintìffs'
insurance counsel like Jim Hunt who
inhabit the state.
Standard fìled suit for declantory
and injunctive relief in the Helena
Division of the Montâna Federal
District Court on September 26,
2006, and in the Montana FirstJudi-
cial District Court in Lewis and Clark
County at the same time. ,{fter dis-
covery in the federal suit, the parties
submitted the case on cross molions
for summary judgment. On February
27, 2008,Judge Molloy denied
Standard Insurance Company's
motion and granted Commissioner
Morrison's motion concluding that
Morrison's action in prohibiting the
discretionary clause "is the straight
forward regulation of insurance, a
matter ERISA expressly saves from
preemption."ao That decision is on
appeal to the 9ú Circuit and has been
fully briefed and argued byJim Hunt
on behalf of the Commissioner.
Standard shifted its argument at the
9ú Circuit expanding its contenúon
that Morrison's act of prohibiting
the discretionary clause under MCA
S 33-1-502 is actually a remedy that
conflicts with ERISlt's remedial
scheme. Standard even impJied that
Judge Molloy found Morrison's statu-
tory interpretation conflicted with
ERISA, but Molly actually found the
opposite, saylng Morrison's disap-
proval of discretionary clauses ¿'does
not implicate ERISlfs enforcement
scheme at alJ., and is no different
from the types of substantive state
regulation of insurance contract
fthe Supreme Court has] in the past
permitted to survive preemption."4l
The state couft action also went
down on cross motions for summary
judgment the issue there being
whether Morrison's decision that the
discretionary clause,violated MC,\
S 33-1-502 was correct.a2Judge
Honzel, quoted Standard's Grant of
Discretion clause which provided,
'qX/e will pay benefits under the
Group Policy if we decide that you
are entitled to them... In exercising
our discretiori, we must act pfudently
and in the interest of all Members."
Honzel noted with approval the Cali-
fornia Superior Courtt holding that
such a discretionary clause renders
tlre insurer's promise to pay uncertairì,
ambþous, misleading, and illusory,
and he held that Standard's clause was
ambiguous and inconsistent so as to
violate the starute.a3 That decision
was not appealed. Hence, the remain-
ing issue pending before the 9ú Cir-
cuit is whether Morrison's prohibitìon
of disctetionary clauses under the
Montana statutes is regulation of
insurance saved from the preemptìon
of ERISA.
Conclusion
Perhaps there is some hope on
the horizon. Recently, in Metropolitan
Lile lm Co. u. G/enn,.128 S.C,t.2343
(2008), the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized that "a plan admjnistrator that
both evaluateq and pays claims oper-
ates undet a conflict of interest" and
pondered how a court could account
for such a conflict of interest. Glenn,
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at 2347. Whtle it seems patently
obvious that a for-profìt insutance
company gets to keep more of the
ptemium dollar paid by the employer
when the insurer denies a plan
participant's claim for plan benefìts,
the Supreme Court stumbled when
cletermining the standard of review
federal courts should apply when
reviewing such a conflicted denial of
plan benefìts to a plan part-icipant.
The Supreme Court did not do away
with the abuse of discretion standarcl
and adopt instead a de nouo standard
as it should have done. Instead, the
majority, after much dithering on
what to do, approved the old abuse
of discretion standard but directed
lower courts to take into account as
^ 
f^ctor the conFlict of interest in
reviewing the decision of the plan
administrator. In short, the holding ìn
Clenn does nothing more than affirrr'
the status quo with regard to the
ERISA standarcl of review whjle
tecognizing that there does appear
to be a conflict of interest for plan
administrators who fund the plan
benefìts.
The remarkable power imbalance
bet\x,een insureds ancl insurers under
ERISA, is most apparent in the insur-
ers' jnsertion of the discrerionary
clauses and the courts' consequerrt
cleference to decisions made under
those clauses. Thc ultimate unFairness
of denying de nouo review and
requiring a showing of abuse of
discretion where the insurer has
unreasonably withheld or denied a
benefit prompted the NAIC to draft
ancl recommend rules prohibiting the
discretionary clause.
Given the vast economic benefit
to the insurers in arming their plans
with a clause so antithetical to the
v¡elfare of the plan benefìciaries, the
prohibition of the clause has sparked
the important htigation now at the
9ú Circuit and possibly headed for
the United States Supreme Court. If
the Commissioners who have been
forthright enough to ban the clauses
can prevail, a great blow will have
been struck for insurance consumers
of health, disability, and acciclent
plans. May the force be with them!
ADDENDUM
After this article was submitted
for publication, the 9ù Circuit on
September 14,2009 {ilecl its decision
in Montowr u. Llartford Liþ dv Accident
bt¡ørance Compary¡, Q:07 -cv-0521. 5-
DSF-RZ). There, Hartford was both
the clisability plan administrator and
the insurer ancl inserted a discretion-
ary clause intt-r its plan. Flartford
terminated the ERIS,\ disabilty ben-
efìts of Montour who qualified for
Social Security disabitity by reason of
significant psychiatric disorders as
wcll as orthopedjc problems. After
starting benefìts, Hartfotd conducted
sutveillance with no signifìcant result
and hired multiple consulting experts
to gain opinions that Montour coulcl
do Jight or sedentary work. The
experts conductccl "pure paper"
reviews and no physical exâms.
Hartforclt resulting terrninatjon
of benefìts was teviewed in fecleral
district court under an abuse of
cliscretion standard, and Hartford
was awarded summâry judgment.
The 9'h Circuit tevetsed, ordered
summâry judgment for Montour, ancl
reinstated his disability benefits. The
court reâsorred that Hartforcl's con-
flict oF interest moLivatcd its dccision
to terminâte Montour's benefits to
the point that it constituted an abuse
of administrative discretion. In re-
viewing the record frclm the clistrict
court, the 9'h Circuit concluded,
"Hartford's bias infiltrated the entire
administrative decision making pro-
cess, which leads us to accord signifì-
cant weight to the conflict." In such
a weighty conflict, the 9ù Circuit
asserted that it still applies the abuse
of discretion standard but says that,
under that standard, if the conflict is
tl
:
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substantìal, the denial constitutes an
abuse of adminismative discretion.
Montoar is salutafy because a weighty
conflict should exist in many discre-
tionary clause cases where the disabil-
ity benefits insurer is also the ERIS,\
plan administrâror.
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